Abstract
An increasingly large number of babies are born to unwed parents in the United States
every year. This phenomenon is problematical for putative fathers in adoption proceedings
because it is difficult to protect such a father’s rights while advancing the child’s best interests.
Many states, such as Missouri, have responded by enacting putative father registries. An unwed
father may file his intent to claim paternity with the Missouri Putative Father Registry in a
postcard to insure notice of any proceeding that may affect his parental rights. However, a
Missouri putative father who has not filed with the registry and taken affirmative steps to
establish his paternity legally waives his right to consent to adoption in Missouri. As such, a
juvenile officer’s petitioning to terminate his parental rights prior to the filing of an adoption
petition is unnecessary and serves only to prolong the process. Because a putative father who
has not timely availed himself of the registry and affirmatively asserted his paternity has no legal
rights or obligations concerning his child, this Note argues that the juvenile officer need only to
petition for a declaration that the father has no right to grant or to withhold consent to an
adoption proceeding at a particular point in time. Such a policy better fulfills the legislative
goals of a putative father registry and is in the best interests of the children. Expediting the
adoption process in this fashion has implications not only for Missouri putative fathers, but also
unwed fathers in all states that have enacted putative father registries.
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Putative Fathers Take Note! Revisiting In re Loveheart and Revising the Rule of Notice in
Dependency Proceedings in Light of Missouri’s Revised Statutes and Putative Father Registry.
I. INTRODUCTION
“Out of wedlock births in the United States have climbed to an all-time high.”1
A recent government study indicates that nearly four in every ten babies born in the
United States have unwed parents.2 While natural mothers have a unilateral right to abort or to
deliver the child, the nature of the unwed father’s rights remains an unsettled area of the law.3
According to Martin Bauer, president of the American Academy of Adoption Attorneys who
specializes in contested adoptions, the “most common contest is where the mom wants to place
the baby [for adoption] and the dad objects.”4 Putative fathers’5 legal rights have become of
increasing concern in conjunction with the expanding number of those unwed fathers who wish
to play a role in their children’s lives.
When the mother’s rights are voluntarily or involuntarily terminated and the plan is
adoption, the crucial issue becomes what rights a putative father has, and also what he must do to
avail himself of them. The difficulty arises in balancing the weight of the father’s biological ties
when he has not assumed legal or custodial responsibilities for the child against the necessity of
expeditiously placing the child in a stable adoptive home.6
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Almost 4 in 10 Children Born Out of Wedlock in 2005, USA Today, Nov. 21, 2006, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2006-11-21-births_x.htm.
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Id. The report also indicated that, while many people associate out-of-wedlock births with teen mothers, “births
among unwed mothers rose most dramatically among women in their 20s.” Id.
3
Tamar Lewin, Unwed Fathers Fight for Babies Placed for Adoption by Unwed Mothers, N.Y Times, Mar. 19,
2006, at A10.
4
Id.
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The term ‘putative father’ means “a man who has had sexual relations with a woman to whom he is not married
and is therefore presumed to know that such woman may be pregnant as a result of such relations.” Protecting
Rights of Unknowing Dads and Fostering Access to Help Encourage Responsibility (Proud Father) Act of 2006, S.
3803, 109th Cong. §440(8) (2006). This note will use the term ‘putative father’ throughout to mean a biological
father who is not a presumed father (by marriage), an acknowledged father (whose name is on the birth certificate),
or an adjudicated father (one who has timely filed a paternity action).
6
Lewin, supra note 3.
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Presumably because of the burgeoning number of babies born out of wedlock, courts in
the last few decades have consistently held that a putative father’s rights concerning his child are
entitled to constitutional protection in certain situations.7 For instance, putative fathers in almost
all states are entitled to notice of an adoption proceeding or of a hearing to terminate their
parental rights.8 However, states generally require a putative father to take some action, such as
registering with the state’s putative father registry or taking steps to assert his paternity, in order
to protect his rights and insure they are entitled to such constitutional protection.9 Thus, the
constitutional protection of a putative father’s rights concerning his child is not unlimited, and
requires that he affirmatively “grasp the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child.”10
This Note will elucidate why a putative father who has not registered timely with
Missouri’s Putative Father Registry and/or taken steps to establish his paternity does not have
parental status under Missouri statutory or case law. Such a putative father’s failure to protect
his rights results in his having no legal rights or obligations concerning his child.11 Because his
parental rights have not legally sprung into being, they do not need to be terminated.12 This Note
will argue that such a father does not have standing to receive notice of a pending adoption and
Missouri juvenile officers should petition for a declaration that the putative or unknown father
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Child Welfare Information Gateway, The Rights of Presumed (Putative) Fathers,
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/putative.cfm.
8
Id.
9
Id. Mailing in a postcard to the putative father registry assures the putative father that he will receive notice of
termination of parental rights or adoption proceedings. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). States vary in
the information they maintain in their registries, though commonly included are the name, address, social security
number and date of birth of the putative father and natural mother, the name and address of any person adjudicated
by a court to be the father, and the child’s name, date of birth and registration number. Child Welfare Information
Gateway, supra note 7.
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Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
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As will be illustrated, under Missouri law such a father has no standing to challenge an adoption proceeding and
need not be served with notice of termination of parental rights. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 453.030.2(a)-(c) (2000)
(stating when a man’s consent is required in adoption proceedings); T.A.B. v. Corrigan, 600 S.W.2d 87 (Mo.App.
E.D. 1980) (holding that there is no requirement that notice of termination of parental rights proceedings be given to
a putative father who has not acknowledged the child by affirmatively asserting paternity).
12
See Lehr, 463 U.S. 261 n.7.
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has waived his consent to adoption rather than for terminating parental rights that do not exist.
Such an exception to the rule of notice of termination of parental rights is embodied in the 1988
Missouri Supreme Court case of In re Loveheart13 and in the Missouri Revised Statutes,14 and
will better serve the underlying policy of the state.
The first section of this Note will examine the nature and genesis of parental rights as
discussed in the landmark 1983 Supreme Court case of Lehr v. Robertson. The second portion
will address the evolution of Missouri’s termination of parental rights and adoption statutes,
including their interaction with Missouri’s Putative Father Registry. The next section will
analyze the 1988 Missouri Supreme Court decision of In re Loveheart.15 Finally, the Note will
synthesize the federal and state statutory and case law and advocate for Missouri juvenile
officers to petition for a declaration that a putative father who has taken no steps to assert
paternity or has not filed with the putative father registry has no standing in a lawsuit for
adoption of his child and has waived his consent to any adoption proceeding.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Lehr v. Robertson16 and the Nature of Parental Rights
Lehr v. Robertson was a landmark case for the rights of putative fathers. In Lehr in 1983,
the Supreme Court of the United States sustained an adoption order obtained without the consent
of Lehr, the putative father.17 Lehr had filed a paternity action at the same time that an adoption
proceeding was pending for his daughter, Jessica.18 When Lehr’s attorney asked the judge for a
stay of the adoption proceeding, the judge informed the attorney that he had already signed the
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762 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. 1988).
See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 453.060 (2000) (Missouri’s notice provisions for termination of parental rights) .
15
762 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. 1988).
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Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
17
Id. at 265.
18
Id. at 253.
14
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adoption order.19 The judge stated that “he was aware of the pending paternity action but did not
believe he was required to give notice to [Lehr] prior to the entry of the order of adoption.”20
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the adoption and based its decision on
the legal distinction between inchoate and fully developed parental rights.21 The Supreme Court
held that because Lehr had never established a substantial relationship with his child and/or
availed himself of New York’s Putative Father Registry, the judge’s failure to give him notice of
his child’s pending adoption did not deny Lehr Due Process.22 The court noted that “parental
rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They
require relationships more enduring.”23 The significance of the Court’s distinction is that a
putative father’s protected interest in his child does not exist merely through biology.24 Rather, it
is a result of the relationship he establishes with the child and the responsibility he assumes for
her.25
The Lehr court emphasized that the importance of the familial relationship derives from
the emotional attachments therein, not “the mere existence of a biological link.”26 Thus, only
when an unwed father comes forward “to participate in the rearing of his child” will his interest
in that child acquire due process protection.27 The Court highlighted that, even absent active
participation in raising his child, “the right to receive notice was completely within appellant’s
control” because he could have mailed in a postcard to the putative father registry and been
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Id.
Id.
21
Id. at 261 n.1.
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Id. at 249. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the adoption order despite the state’s knowledge of his
whereabouts. Id. at 273.
23
Id. (quoting Caban v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979)).
24
Id. at 261.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392).
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guaranteed notice of any proceedings that might effect his parental rights. 28 Thus, New York’s
statutory scheme protected the child’s best interests, and adequately balanced the biological
father’s interest in his child and the state’s interest in a speedy adoption.29
In sum, the Lehr Court established that, until a putative father takes substantial steps in
demonstrating a commitment to creating a relationship with his child, the state will only protect
his opportunity to develop a relationship with the child, and not the relationship itself.30 In an
adoption proceeding, this means that the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the
Constitution “do not give a putative father an absolute right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard before a child may be adopted.”31
B. Evolution of the Putative Father’s Rights in Missouri
1. Termination of Parental Rights
Even the putative father who had asserted his paternity in some form did not always have
legal rights concerning his child prior to the Lehr decision. Not until 1972 in Stanley v. Illinois
did the Supreme Court of the United States first directly address and recognize a putative father’s
rights.32 The putative father in Stanley had lived with his children all their lives and their mother
for eighteen years.33 He brought an Equal Protection challenge to an Illinois statute that
automatically declared illegitimate children wards of the state when their mothers died,
regardless of the relationship between the children and the unwed father.34 The Court held that
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Id. at 264.
Id. at 263. The Court held that New York’s statutory scheme was not arbitrary because the state has legitimate
interests in facilitating the adoption of young children, reducing the risk of adoption controversies, and ensuring the
finality of adoption decrees. The Court held that New York’s Putative Father Registry adequately protected the
unwed father’s inchoate interest in his child. Id. at 264-265.
30
Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
31
In re JF, 719 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Mo. 1986).
32
405 U.S. 645 (1972).
33
Id. at 646.
34
Id. at 645. The statute did not provide for a hearing on parental fitness or require proof of neglect, though both
were required before children of married or divorced parents could be declared wards of the state. Id.
29
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the statute violated the Equal Protection clause because it did not give a putative father the
opportunity to prove his fitness as a parent before the children were made wards of the state.35
After the Stanley decision, Missouri began recognizing the emerging status of the
putative father. Prior to 1978, Missouri statutes did not define the term “parent” or address
notice and termination of parental rights.36 Because Missouri statutes did not recognize the
putative father, the statutory scheme did not provide such an unwed father with any legally
recognized parental rights. In 1978, however, the Missouri Supreme Court first addressed and
recognized a putative father’s rights in the case of State v. Edwards.37
The putative father in Edwards continuously visited his child in foster care and demanded
custody of him.38 Unbeknownst to him, the mother had unilaterally consented to termination of
her parental rights and to a waiver of the necessity of consent in her son’s future adoption.39 The
juvenile officer petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights and to transfer legal custody
of the child.40
The putative father in Edwards brought Due Process and Equal Protection challenges
against the Missouri adoption code and termination of parental rights statute because at that time
they did not require that an unwed father receive notice of termination of his parental rights
before an adoption proceeding.41 The Missouri Supreme Court agreed and held the statutes
unconstitutional to the extent they permitted severance of all parental rights of an illegitimate
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Id.
State ex rel. T.A.B. v. Corrigan, 600 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Mo.App. E.D. 1980).
37
574 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. 1978).
38
Id. at 406 (Mo. 1978).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 408. The statute in effect at that time, provided that: “If the court terminate(s) the parental rights of both
parents, (or) Of the mother if the child is illegitimate, . . . it may transfer the guardianship and legal custody of the
child to a suitable person, or the state division of welfare (now the Division of Family Services), or a licensed child
welfare agency.” Thus, for illegitimate children, this statute permitted severance of all parental rights though only
the rights of the mother had been severed. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.501.2 (2000).
36
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child though only the parental rights of the mother had been terminated.42 The court held that,
“the same presumption of fitness afforded married fathers in parental termination proceedings
[should] be afforded to natural fathers after a reasonable showing of fatherly concern in such
cases.”43
In response to Edwards and the overall increasing awareness of the “emerging status of
the putative father,”44 Missouri revised its termination of parental rights statutes to protect the
putative father who has affirmatively asserted his paternity. RSMo section 211.444 now
provides that a juvenile officer or court where an adoption proceeding is pending may terminate
a parent’s rights if it is in the best interest of the child and the parent has consented in writing.45
The most significant statutory revision for the putative father was the addition of the definition
for “parent.”
RSMo section 211.442 now defines the term “parent” as both biological parents, and also
the mother and the putative father of a child.46 A qualification in the second sentence of the
definition, however, requires that the putative father acknowledge the child as his own by
“affirmatively asserting his paternity” in order to acquire a legal relationship to the child.47 The
result of the statute is that, unlike biological mothers, not all putative fathers are parents for
purposes of the statute. Consistent with Lehr, Missouri courts have held that a putative father
who does not take steps to care for or establish a relationship with his child, is not entitled to the
42

Id. at 409.
Id. The court held that the state was free to require that the unwed father prove “a meaningful intent and a
continuing capacity to assume responsibility with respect to the supervision, protection and care of the child” before
he need receive the benefit of the same presumption of fitness enjoyed by other parents. Id.
44
T.A.B., 600 S.W.2d at 90.
45
Mo. Rev. Stat § 211.444.1 (2000).
46
Mo. Rev. Stat § 211.442(3) (2000).
47
Mo. Rev. Stat § 211.442(3) (2000). The statute in full defines a “parent” as: “a biological parent or parents of a
child, as well as, the husband of a natural mother at the time the child was conceived, or a parent or parents of a
child by adoption, including both the mother and the putative father of a child. The putative father of a child shall
have no legal relationship unless he, prior to the entry of a decree under sections 211.442 to 211.487, has
acknowledged the child as his own by affirmatively asserting his paternity.”
43
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protection embodied in the notice provisions in the termination of parental rights statutes.48
However, after 1978, Missouri affords a putative father who affirmatively asserts his paternity a
right to notice of termination of his parental rights before an adoption might proceed.49
T.A.B. v. Corrigan was decided in 1980, two years after the statutory amendments.
Corrigan addressed the interpretation of newly-revised RSMo section 211.442 and the added
definition of the term “parent.”50 The unmarried mother in T.A.B. had consented to termination
of her parental rights but refused to identify the putative father for the court so that he could be
served with notice of termination of his parental rights as well.51 The juvenile court held the
mother in contempt on the “erroneous belief that [211.442] required that notice be given to [the]
putative father.”52
The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the putative father in question was not a parent
under the definition of RSMo section 211.442 and thus was not entitled to notice of termination
of his parental rights.53 The putative father in T.A.B. did not even know of the birth of the child
and had not taken any steps to establish a “legal relationship” with his child by affirmatively
asserting his paternity.54 Therefore, he did not qualify as a parent under the statute.55 In
examining legislative intent in enacting RSMo section 211.442, the court stated:
Only a parent, that is, a putative father who acknowledges his child by
affirmatively asserting his paternity, is entitled to be served. The legislature could
properly have enacted a provision allowing any identified putative father, whether
48

See In re J.F., 719 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. 1986); T.A.B. v. Corrigan, 600 S.W.2d 87 (Mo.App. E.D. 1980).
See T.A.B., 600 S.W.2d 87 (holding that only the putative father who acknowledges his child by affirmatively
asserting his paternity is entitled to notice prior to termination of parental rights for purposes of adoption).
50
See Id.
51
Id. at 88-89.
52
Id. at 87.
53
Id. at 93. Consequently, the Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court’s holding the mother in contempt was
erroneous. Id. at 94.
54
Id. at 92.
55
Id. at 93.
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or not he had acknowledged the child by affirmatively asserting paternity, to
receive notice. It did not do so.56
The Corrigan court distinguished between a “parent” and any identified putative father in
order to fulfill legislative intent in the revised termination of parental rights and adoption
statutes.57 The primary goal of Missouri’s newly-revised statutes was to achieve a “complete
and final divestment of all legal rights, privileges, duties and obligations of the parent and
child.”58 However, when the putative father in question had not even acknowledged his child, he
did not meet the statutory definition of a parent.59 Therefore, he was not within the statute’s
scope and the court held that the notice of termination of parental rights statutes did not apply to
him.
The Missouri Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of Missouri’s revised
statutory scheme in 1986 in In re J.F. v. Boone County Juvenile Officer.60 The J.F. court held
that the notice of termination of parental rights statutes did not apply to a biological father who
had not affirmatively asserted his paternity.61 The putative father in question was not a parent
under the definition of RSMo section 211.442(3) because he had not acknowledged the child as
his own by affirmatively asserting paternity.62 Like Corrigan, the J.F. court relied on several
Supreme Court cases, including Stanley v. Illinois, for the proposition that a putative father who
has not established a substantial relationship with his child was not entitled to certain procedural
56

Id. at 92. The court indicated various ways in which the putative father could have identified himself, some of
which it said would also satisfy the requirement of acknowledging the child. These included filing an affidavit
stating he is the father, placing his name on the birth certificate, and seeking an admission of paternity with the
mother and filing it with the court. It did not, however, clarify exactly what affirmative steps to establish paternity
would be sufficient to meet the statutory definition of a parent. See Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
719 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. 1986).
61
Id. at 792. The court referenced Missouri statutes 211.442 – 211.487 specifically.
62
Id. at 791. Though it is not entirely clear from the opinion, it does not appear that the putative father in J.F. had
any relationship at all with his child. The opinion only says that the natural mother “did not tell the father of the
pregnancy because she did not intend to carry the child to term.” Id. at 791.
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due process protections, including notice of pending adoption proceedings.63 Thus, Missouri’s
“termination of parental rights statutes [. . .] do not apply,”64 and waiver of service to the J.F.
father was not unconstitutional.
2. Adoption Proceedings
RSMo section 453.030 delineates whose consent is required in an adoption proceeding.65
These persons include the mother, certain fathers, and a putative father.66 The father’s consent is
required only if 1) he is presumed to be the father pursuant to RSMo sections 210.822(1), (2) or
(3),67 2) he has filed an action to establish paternity within fifteen days of the baby’s birth, or 3)
he has registered with the putative father registry within fifteen days of the baby’s birth and has
filed an action to establish paternity.68
RSMo section 453.030 states its consent-to-adoption requirement is subject to the
exceptions provided for in 453.040.69 The most pertinent exception for purposes of this Note is
that a parent whose parental rights have been terminated pursuant to law70 need not give consent
before an adoption can proceed.71 Thus, in Missouri, a putative father who is not a presumed,
acknowledged, or adjudicated father and who fails to register with the Putative Father Registry
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Id.
Id at 791.
65
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 453.030 (2000).
66
§ 453.030.3(1)-(2).
67
These subsections indicate that a man will be presumed to be the father if: (1) he and the child’s natural mother
are or have been married to each other and the child is born during the marriage or within 300 days of its being
terminated; (2) before the child’s birth he and the natural mother have attempted to marry; and (3) after the child’s
birth he and the natural mother have attempted to marry. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 210.822.1(1)-(3) (2000).
68
§ 453.030.2(a)-(c).
69
§ 453.030.3.
70
RSMo § 211.447 addresses when a juvenile court may petition to terminate parental rights without the parental
consent. These situations include, but are not limited to, when a child is found to be an abandoned infant or has
been in foster care for at least fifteen of the most recent twenty two months. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.444.2-6
(2000).
71
§ 453.040(1). Other pertinent exceptions to the consent requirement include a parent whose identity is unknown
and cannot be ascertained at the time of filing the petition and a parent who fails to make an appearance in an
adoption proceeding or for termination of parental rights. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 453.040(3), (5) (2001).
64

11

or otherwise affirmatively assert paternity, or a father whose parental rights have been terminated
pursuant to law waives rights to consent to an adoption.
J.B.B. & B.L.B. v. Baby Girl S. was decided shortly after Corrigan and extended its
holding regarding notice of termination of parental rights to adoption proceedings.72 In J.B.B.,
the circuit court had terminated the rights of the natural mother and found that the natural father
was unknown.73 The court subsequently placed the baby in foster care and decreed her adoption
eight months later, without the consent of either of the natural parents.74
The father challenged the constitutionality of RSMo section 453.030 on Due Process and
Equal Protection grounds to the extent that it allowed an adoption to proceed without his consent
after a termination of parental rights hearing of which he had no notice.75 The Missouri Court of
Appeals relied on Corrigan in upholding the validity of the statute, stating “[t]here is nothing in
the record to show that he has taken any affirmative steps to assert his paternity. It follows that
the unknown father here was not a ‘parent’ under the statute and was not entitled to notice.”76
3. Putative Father Registry
The creation of a putative father registry and its effects are two different things.77
Normally the effects of the registry represent a complex interaction between a state’s adoption
and termination of parental rights statutes. In some states, an unwed father has no right to
withhold consent to an adoption if he has not registered with that state’s registry.78 In other
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J.B.B & B.L.B v. Baby Girl S., 611 S.W.2d 359 (Mo.App. E.D. 1980). J.B.B. was decided in 1980, prior to
Missouri’s establishing its putative father registry in 1988.
73
Id. at 360.
74
Id.
75
Id. The court points out that, because it could not locate him, it did not terminate the putative father’s rights but
rather made a findng only that he was unknown. Id.
76
Id. at 362.
77
Lewin, supra note 3.
78
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-106.01 (2001) (stating that a putative father who wants to receive notice of adoption
proceedings and who is the father or claims to be the father shall file notice of a claim of paternity and willingness to
support the child to the best of his ability within 30 days of the child’s birth) (emphasis added).
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states, failure to register timely with the putative father registry results in termination of all
parental rights and obligations towards the child.79 Currently, thirty two states have erected
some form of putative father registry,80 and the necessary legislation has been passed in one
other.81 The allotted time period for filing with states’ registries varies anywhere from prior to
the baby’s birth or immediately thereafter,82 to sixty days after receiving notice of termination of
parental rights proceedings.83
Missouri enacted its putative father registry in 1988.84 A putative father in Missouri must
file a notice of intent to claim paternity with the Registry during the pregnancy or within fifteen
days of the baby’s birth in order to retain rights to consent to an adoption proceeding.85 In 2004,
Missouri amended its Putative Father Registry statute86 to provide that failure to register timely
with the Registry waives a putative father’s ability to withhold consent to an adoption.87

79

See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 170-B:6(I)(c) (2001) (stating that failure to file timely with registry shall bar the
alleged father from thereafter bringing an action to establish paternity and shall constitute an abandonment of the
child and a waiver of any right to receive notice of a hearing in an adoption proceeding).
80
See Lindsay Biesterfield, Analysis of State Laws Allowing Men to Register Paternity Claims, Spring 2006
(unpublished table, Professor Mary Beck’s Family Violence Clinic, University of Missouri-Columbia School of
Law). The effects of states’ putative father registry statutes vary from being an almost meaningless registry to those
that seriously effect substantive parental rights. See Id.
81
Virginia’s legislature has passed putative father legislation, and the registry will be established in 2007. Id.
82
See MCLA § 710.33(1) (stating that, before the birth of a child born out of wedlock, a person claiming under oath
to be the father of the child may file a verified notice of intent to claim paternity with the court in any county of this
state); Mont. Code Ann. § 42-2-202 (stating a putative father must file with the registry within seventy two hours of
the baby’s birth);
83
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-716(b) (stating that a putative father must file a claim for paternity no later than sixty
days after receiving notice of termination of parental rights proceedings).
84
Biesterfield, supra note 80.
85
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 453.030.3(c) (2000). While Missouri’s rule may seem strict, some other states’ registries are not
as generous as Missouri’s. For example, the Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the constitutionality of its putative
father statute, which requires a putative father both to file with the registry within five days of the baby’s birth and
to assume financial responsibility for the child. Failure to do so results in termination of the putative father’s
parental rights. The statute does not provide for notification to the father of the baby’s birth and a putative father’s
lack of knowledge of the birth is not a defense for failure to register. See Shoecraft v. Catholic Soc. Serv. Bureau,
Inc., 222 Neb. 574 (Neb. 1986).
86
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 192.016 (2000).
87
In re P.G.M. v. Jasper County Juvenile Office, 149 S.W.3d 507, 514 n.9 (Mo.App. S.D. 2004). Missouri’s
putative father registry statute provides that failure to register results in loss of ability to withhold consent to an
adoption unless the man was led to believe through the mother’s fraud or misrepresentation that: (a) she was not
actually pregnant when she in fact was; (b) the pregnancy was terminated when in fact the baby was born; or (c) that
the baby died after birth when the baby is in fact alive. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 192.016.7(1) (2000).
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Therefore, pursuant to the effects of RSMo section 192.016, establishing Missouri’s Putative
Father Registry, and RSMo section 453.030, defining whose consent is necessary in an adoption
proceeding, unmarried fathers in Missouri who are not presumed to be the father essentially
waive their rights to withhold consent to an adoption if they fail to file a paternity action, register
timely with the Putative Father Registry, or otherwise affirmatively assert their paternity.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In re Loveheart
The appellant mother of In re Loveheart was a minor, and therefore her biological
daughter was made a ward of the court four months after the baby’s birth.88 Two months later
the juvenile court filed a petition to terminate appellant’s parental rights pursuant to RSMo
sections 211.453 and 506.160.89 Appellant, however, was not notified in person or via
publication of the termination of her parental rights because the court could not locate her.90 The
trial court nonetheless terminated the appellant’s parental rights as to her biological daughter and
waived the necessity of service to her pursuant to RSMo section 211.453.91 The appellant
mother appealed and challenged the constitutionality of RSMo section 211.453 on due process
grounds to the extent that it allowed for termination of her parental rights without notice to her.92
The Loveheart court held RSMo section 211.453 unconstitutional as violative of
appellant’s due process rights “insofar as it removes the necessity of notice by publication to a
parent whose identity is unknown and cannot be ascertained or cannot be located.”93 The court
distinguished the case at bar from Lehr on the basis that New York, unlike Missouri, had a
88

In re Loveheart v. Long, 762 S.W.2d 32, 33 (Mo. 1988).
Id. RSMo section 211.453 was the statute pertaining to termination of parental rights and section 506.150
addressed the procedure for service of summons. Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. RSMo section 211.453.3 provides that: “The court shall not require service in the case of a parent whose
identity is unknown and cannot be ascertained, or cannot be located.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.453.3 (2000).
92
Id.
93
Id. at 34.
89
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Putative Father Registry.94 The putative father in Lehr could have availed himself of New
York’s Putative Father Registry and been ensured of notice of termination of his parental
rights.95 The mother in Loveheart did not have access to a putative father registry in 1988 in
Missouri because Missouri’s registry, established in 1988, presumably was not yet operative and
pertains to fathers only. Thus, In re Loveheart stood for the proposition that Due Process
requires that a known natural parent must receive notice of termination of parental rights, absent
a parental registry.
The concept of notice is a fundamental component of due process and was central to the
Loveheart court’s holding. The appellant mother did not receive notice of proceedings that
effected her substantive parental rights and therefore was denied due process. However, through
its discussion of Lehr, the Loveheart court acknowledged that notice would not necessarily have
been required if Missouri had a Putative Father Registry in place. The court stated, “Missouri
provides no statutory mechanism by which appellant could have entered her name on a registry
so as to acquire the right to receive notice of proceedings affecting her parental rights.”96
In fact, Missouri enacted its putative father registry in 1988, the same year that Loveheart
was decided. The Missouri Supreme Court did not seem to know of the existence of the
Registry, and in any case Missouri’s Registry is for fathers only, and Loveheart’s appellant was a
mother. However, through its holding, the Loveheart court explicitly left open the possibility
that the lessons of notice contained in the decision might not apply to fathers once Missouri had
a Putative Father Registry in place.
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IV. COMMENT
Adoption proceedings of dependent children typically are a bifurcated process. Either
both parents are known and have voluntarily terminated their parental rights or the juvenile
officer seeks to involuntarily terminate both sets of parental rights.97 Afterwards, the adoptive
parents file a separate petition for transfer of custody and adoption.98
The Loveheart court established that a known natural parent, even one who cannot be
located, is entitled to notice of termination of parental rights and acknowledged the additional
protection available for those unwed fathers in states with putative father registries who could
arrange to receive notice themselves.99 After 1988, an unwed biological father in Missouri can
insure notice of adoption per Missouri’s Putative Father Registry, RSMo section 192.016.100
Furthermore, RSMo section 453.030.2(b) states that an unwed father who has filed a paternity
action or acknowledged paternity pursuant to RSMo section 210.823 is entitled to notice as well.
Thus, Missouri case law and statutory scheme stand for the proposition that a putative
father is entitled to notice in termination of parental rights and that his consent is necessary to an
adoption if he has affirmatively asserted his paternity, availed himself of the Registry, filed a
paternity action, or is a presumed,101 adjudicated,102 or acknowledged103 father.
Voluntary or involuntary, termination of parental rights and adoption proceedings are
serious processes that are necessary for the child’s protection and welfare. The result of
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termination of parental rights is often the severance of all ties between the parent and child.104
The biological parent is no longer a parent in the eyes of the law and has no further legal rights
or obligations to the child.105 Subsequently, the result of adoption proceedings are the reverse
for the adoptive parents. Adoption statutes embody the notion that, even without blood ties, a
parent/child relationship may be established through law.106 Thus, the resulting relationship for
the adoptive parents and child is treated no differently from that of a natural parent/child
relationship under the law.
Keeping these serious consequences in mind, the issue of notice in terminating a
putative father’s parental rights and obtaining his consent in adoption proceedings assumes
different connotations where the father has not filed a paternity action, registered with the state’s
putative father registry, or taken any other affirmative steps to assert his paternity. Such a
putative father is not ‘parent’ under the Missouri statutes107 and Missouri case law and RSMo
section 453.060 hold that due process does not require notice of termination of parental rights or
adoption proceedings to this identified father.108 This fact relieves the juvenile officer of the
need to terminate such putative father’s parental rights before the filing of a petition for adoption.
Rather than continuing to petition to terminate the parental rights of such a putative father
before allowing an adoption to proceed, the juvenile officer needs only to petition for a
declaration that this father has no rights to withhold consent to an adoption. Such a procedure
would be consistent with the lessons of notice embodied in Loveheart. As mentioned, Loveheart
acknowledged that if Missouri had a Putative Father Registry in place, whereby an unwed father
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could protect his own right to notice of termination of parental rights, a father who did not meet
Missouri’s statutory definition of a “parent” would not be entitled to the due process protection
of notice.109
Furthermore, such a policy is consistent with the consent to adoption requirement
embodied in RSMo section 453.030. This statute clearly establishes that only a man who has
filed a paternity action, affirmatively asserted paternity, filed with the Putative Father Registry,
or constitutes a presumed, acknowledged, or adjudicated father must consent before an adoption
may proceed. Thus, because Missouri statutory and case law does not recognize a putative father
who has not taken affirmative steps to assert his paternity, it is clearly established that neither
affords him any legal rights or obligations concerning the child. Therefore, juvenile officers’
petitioning to terminate his parental rights is superfluous.
Guaranteeing notice to the man registered with the putative father registry and
eliminating the notice requirement for an identified or unknown putative father who has not
registered or otherwise asserted his paternity has serious implications for all the parties involved.
Such a policy benefits the earnest unwed putative father, but at a price of cutting off the rights of
lackadaisical and uninvolved biological dads. Any putative father may protect his own rights by
mailing a postcard indicating a notice of intent to claim paternity to the Bureau of Vital Records
in Missouri. Doing so assures him of receiving notice of all proceedings which may affect his
substantive parental rights, such as an adoption proceeding or termination of his parental rights.
However, the policy has extreme repercussions for the absent putative father who has taken no
steps to assert his paternity and/or does not know of the existence of the putative father registry
whereby he can protect his constitutional rights. Such a putative father is susceptible to losing
his ability to assert parental rights, even without notice to him.
109
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The policy assumes that unwed fathers who are not involved in their children’s lives but
nonetheless wish to retain parental rights will register and establish paternity legally. Such an
unwed man is on notice of the possibility of becoming a father because of his having had sexual
relations with a woman.110 In many states, less than 100 men register each year, primarily
because the men do not know about the registries.111 Over 89,000 babies were born out of
wedlock in Florida alone in 2004,112 and the state’s failure to protect parental rights of so many
putative fathers may seem facially unfair.
However, when the child’s interests in being expeditiously placed in a stable home is
balanced against the interests of an apathetic putative father who has not mailed in a postcard to
the registry, the balance should favor the child’s need for permanency and stability. The
potential for unfairness to the putative father is mitigated when one considers that only the father
who has taken no affirmative steps to assert his paternity or to provide custodial or financial
assistance to his child will be excluded from notice of proceedings that affect his parental
rights.113 As indicated, the Supreme Court has held that Due Process requires that the putative
father who has taken affirmative steps to acknowledge his paternity receive notice of termination
of parental rights and adoption proceedings.
Above all, courts’ utmost concern should remain focused on securing a child’s best
interests. Sometimes that best interest is not satisfied by a child’s staying with his or her
biological parents. In these instances, adoption proceedings must be conducted so as to protect
the rights of biological parents first. Where the putative fathers have neglected their parental
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duties, court proceedings must strive to be expeditious and avoid long and heart-wrenching
battles between the natural and adoptive parents.114
V. CONCLUSION
Missouri’s statutory scheme and case law provide ample protection for the earnest and
vigilant putative father. Thus, expediting the adoption process when an unwed father has
shunned his parental responsibility and failed to assert his rights is fair and best serves the child’s
best interests. Dependency proceedings have serious and lifelong consequences for both natural
parents and their children. Missouri’s putative father registry policy is the best way to conduct
such proceedings so as to protect an unwed father’s rights to his child, while insuring that the
child is promptly placed in a stable adoptive home.
LAUREN STANDLEE
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